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 ABSTRACT
6. The moment of Leveson: 
Beyond ‘First Amendment 
fundamentalism’ in news 
regulatory policies
Australian discussion of the Leveson Inquiry has started and finished at 
asking whether ‘we’ suffer from precisely the same ethical malaise that 
led to phone-hacking in the United Kingdom. Yet as Leveson has unfolded 
it has become clear that its report will have international significance as 
a watershed moment in content regulation in a multi-platform future. A 
30-year-old neoliberal orthodoxy has promulgated the view that digital 
convergence would mean the expansion of newspaper models of self-
regulation to all future platforms. Broadcast models of structural and 
content regulation would disappear along with spectrum scarcity and other 
‘old media’ trappings. All that is now at serious risk. Instead, for the UK 
at least, the public service obligations placed on commercial broadcast-
ers now appear a more evident success story in maintaining journalistic 
integrity. Convergence might mean instead that public service obligations 
should be applied to newspaper publishers. However, making sense of all 
this from Australia is rendered difficult by the failure of our regulatory 
regimes to set such standards for commercial broadcast journalism at even 
levels achieved in the US at its broadcast regulatory high watermark. This 
article thus weighs up recommendations of the Finklestein and Boreham 
reviews in this context.
Keywords: broadcasting, digital convergence, freedom of expression, 
Leveson, media freedom, media law, media regulation, newspapers, press 
councils,  pseudo-journalism
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DIGITAL convergence of the formerly discrete platforms of broad-casting and newspaper publishing has consequences for any talk of regulation, supportive or oppositional. It requires that anyone ad-
dressing the possible regulation of all ‘converged’ journalism be familiar 
with the regulation of broadcast journalism. Yet it is fair to say that the statu-
tory regulation of commercial broadcast journalism is not well understood in 
Australia where self/co-regulation by industry codes has been the dominant 
norm. There has never been an Australian regulatory regime that meets in-
ternational standards. So envisaging a successful regime takes either some 
imagination or the labour of comparative analysis. Critical debate has tended 
to focus instead on proprietorial partisanship and its consequences, a legacy 
of the former historical dominance of broadcast ownership by newspaper 
publishers. Such a perspective has strongly informed the recent polarised 
debate about the establishment of the Finkelstein Inquiry and the reception 
of its report. 
From that critical perspective, ABC journalism has thus functioned as a 
kind of default embodiment of independent good practice, a view reaching its 
highpoint in the Whitlam government plan to model a newspaper on the ABC 
(Whitlam, 1985, p. 580). The best measure of commercial broadcast journal-
ism’s incapacity to compete with the ABC in quality is the blindness of the 
ABC’s conservative critics to the existence of market alternatives. Never is 
commercial broadcast journalism held up as an alternative to the ABC’s amid 
the ritualised charges of bias. 
None of this is especially healthy for Australian democracy. There is at 
least suggestive evidence that Australia has polarised television audience-
publics—with dramatically different levels of political knowledge and so 
informed citizenship. This at a time when television is only gradually yielding 
its place as most-nominated source of news (Jones & Pusey, 2010).
But this is to compare journalism with journalism. Australia’s laissez-faire 
broadcast regulation has permitted the rise of forms of pseudo-journalism in 
commercial television current affairs and the importation of US aggressive talk 
radio formats. These are the standard targets of the ABC’s MediaWatch. Few 
journalists would openly defend such practices, but suggestions of regulation 
are usually met with anxiety about freedom of expression.1
So, whatever the cause, the unusual temporal alignment of the UK Leve-
son Inquiry with two Australian media inquiries is highly fortuitous. For, as 
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argued below, UK policymakers can look to their broadcast regulation for 
inspiration in addressing the widely acknowledged failure of the press council 
model. Freedom of expression is at the fore of these discussions because of 
the existence of the UK Human Rights Act which ‘harmonises’ with European 
legal frameworks. 
To this extent that forgotten Whitlam strategy of basing newspaper policy 
in broadcast precedent was prescient, even if Whitlam’s regrettable practical 
legacy was the abolition of the ABC’s licence fee, so removing a major source 
of relatively independent revenue still enjoyed by the BBC. (Whitlam’s re- 
trospective view from 1985 remained that the ABC license fee was a ‘regres-
sive system … amounting to a  virtual poll tax on every family in Australia’ 
[Whitlam, 1985, p.  577] but no comparably independent alternative revenue 
source was provided, so leaving the ABC vulnerable to direct funding pres-
sures from governments of the day.)
What follows thus briefly tracks the respective broadcast regulatory 
legacies of the US, UK and Australia and their relevance for the current press-
regulatory debate around the inquiries. I have concentrated on content regula-
tion as this is the key indicator from a free speech perspective.
The US legacy: Reliance on ‘technologies of freedom’ 
For a generation, US media and communications policy has been driven by 
the mantra that digital convergence would be an inherently deregulatory, 
market-friendly revolution. Digital abundance would mean that news and 
other media corporations would in future address information-rich consum-
ers, not citizens expecting public services like quality journalism. In effect, 
digital abundance of data, but not necessarily journalism, would deliver a 
return to the 18th century ideals of press freedom by rendering every citizen 
a potential publisher. 
The target of this mantra was the system of broadcast regulation based in 
‘spectrum scarcity’ that had grown up from the 1920s. Licensing of the scarce 
resource of electronic spectrum enabled regulators to place conditions on those 
licences such as ownership rules and codes of practice relating to broadcast 
content. In many jurisdictions codes of conduct for broadcast journalism were 
developed which broadly echoed those in journalists’ codes of ethics. 
Perhaps the most influential academic text in this regard is Ithiel de Sola 
Pool’s Technologies of Freedom (1983), which is often credited with laying 
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the ground for the very concept of convergence (eg. Jenkins, 2006, p. 10). 
Pool certainly anticipates much recent neoliberal deregulatory practice such 
as the selling, rather than licensing, of spectrum. For Pool the starting point 
for considerations of communications policy in democracies is necessarily 
constitutional. The regulation of broadcasting was ‘an uncomfortable partial 
exception’ (1983, p. 133) to US First Amendment principles.  
Analysts of freedom of speech and media regulation routinely distinguish 
between structural and content regulation (Lichtenberg, 1990; cf Petley 2012). 
The terms are reasonably self-descriptive with the weight on content, as the 
freedom is understood chiefly to protect content. The logic here is also driven 
by a First Amendment conception of exceptionalism. In particular, the more 
regulatory practices place a ‘burden on speech’, usually understood to include 
all broadcast content in this context, the more they are at risk of being struck 
down if appealed to the US Supreme Court. In effect, structural regulation is 
a ‘safer’ option for regulators than content regulation. 
However, in the broadcast era structural circumstances were also acknowl-
edged to facilitate content regulation. In the most famous Supreme Court 
decision in this context, the 1959 Red Lion case (Barendt, 1993 p. 158ff), the 
fact that access to broadcasting was restricted by spectrum scarcity and own-
ership patterns was a key factor in the Court’s support of content regulation. 
Content regulation had become necessary because structural circumstanc-
es—notably technical capacity and related ownership configurations—had 
narrowed the avenues of transmission of content. The content regulation at 
issue was the Fairness Doctrine, which required a de facto right of reply if 
programming involving political speech was not sufficiently balanced.  
By 1987 digital convergence was highly anticipated by policymakers and 
the US regulator, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), began 
rescinding the Fairness Doctrine. In this sense Pool’s futurological scenario 
succeeded in ending a chief component of the ‘uncomfortable partial excep-
tion’ to First Amendment principles.  
There is a broad intellectual consensus that the rescinding of the Fairness 
Doctrine substantially contributed to the shape of the US non-print news mar-
ket today. Opinions diverge, of course over the evaluation of these changes. 
The rise of Fox News, most obviously, occurs in this period. It might be more 
accurate, however, to follow Cass Sunstein (1995) and refer to a ‘speech 
market’ rather than ‘news market’ here. For the Fairness Doctrine sought to 
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regulate not only news but all broadcast political speech. The Red Lion case 
itself did not concern news directly but rather the ‘speech’ of a fundamentalist 
preacher—broadcasting on the Red Lion radio station—in which a journalist 
was personally attacked. The journalist then demanded a right of reply. It was 
the journalist’s right of reply that was at issue (Pool, 1983 p. 130; Barendt 
1993,  pp. 158-159). 
Red Lion’s socio-legal complexities speak directly to the present. In many 
ways the current situation is one where fundamentalist speech, most notably 
in the form of aggressive talk radio (to use the US term), is at odds with the 
norms of professional journalism. Such aggressive styles dominated the 250 
percent expansion of this format in the US between 1990 and 2006 (Project 
for Excellence in Journalism, 2007). As in Australia, local radio news was 
what the new subgenre often replaced. 
The emergence of aggressive talk radio of the Rush Limbaugh mode in 
the 1990s, while sometimes closely linked with Fox (Jamieson & Cappella, 
2008), carried other connotations in the US. For many in the blogosphere it 
was reminiscent of an earlier wave of radio populists in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The most notable was Father Charles Coughlin who entered a brief political 
alliance with Governor Huey Long of Louisiana, himself an accomplished 
radio populist. Coughlin and Long were negotiating a challenge to Roosevelt 
(FDR) in the 1936 election when Long was assassinated in 1935 (Brinkley, 
1982). In one set of popular memories at least, the means of historicising 
these two waves of radio populism was clear. What sat between them was the 
Fairness Doctrine. The early radio populists made no pretence to journalism. 
While talk radio has its journalist-pretenders, the parallels are otherwise strik-
ing. A lobby developed several years ago for the reintroduction of a Fairness 
Doctrine by the next Democrat administration (Puzzanghera, 2007).  It failed. 
The Obama administration declined to introduce such content regulation 
(Novak, 2009).
The UK legacy of broadcast regulatory sophistication 
The UK broadcast regulatory system became colloquially known as ‘the least 
worst broadcasting system in the world’ because from the outset it sought 
to address both structural and content issues. A key difference between the 
US and UK systems can be found in the role of editorialisation. Where the 
Fairness Doctrine was premised on the assumption that licence-holders were 
entitled to editorialise, the UK system was premised on the prohibition of all 
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such practice for all licensees (Hitchens, 2006 p.168). To this extent, the UK 
system was even more resistant than the US one to any suggestion that broad-
cast licensees were in the same position as newspaper publishers. 
More generally, while the institutional example of the BBC is well-known 
and was widely emulated, the complementary regulation of commercial broad-
casting, especially television, was poorly understood outside the UK. Some 
elements are familiar—such as content regulation for fairness and impartiality 
based in journalists’ codes of ethics. This element was administered externally 
by the broadcast regulator, however, to the same degree that the BBC admin-
istered its charters internally. That is, unlike Australia, content regulation of 
commercial and BBC journalism was broadly comparable. 
Indeed, for the initial commercial television system as a whole, remarkable 
innovations were developed to avoid one of the key structural features of the 
US system—‘head to head’ competition that facilitated convergent emulation 
of content. The regulatory system was designed to prevent such downsides 
of ‘market forces’ that economists recognise as ‘Hotelling’s Effect’ (Jones & 
Holmes, 2011, pp.  209-213). It is in this context that a major determinant of 
the ‘pseudo-journalism’ referred to above arises—where all journalism’s pro-
fessional ethics and ‘hard’ news values are subordinated to the role of the news 
or current affairs programme as a ‘downmarket’ ratings vehicle. Unusually, the 
British found structural solutions to Hotelling’s effect that lasted many years. 
The chief instruments were the granting of regional monopolies to the ITV 
television licence holders of ‘Channel 3’ and the outsourcing of television news 
production to an external provider, ITN, again underpinning the separation of 
licence-holders from editorial practices. The latter move especially, prior to 
its subsequent dilution, also established a firm buffer between editorial and 
other television production in the commercial sector. Overall, however, the 
key to this combination of structural and content regulation was its regulatory 
‘nudging’ of commercial television journalism to compete qualitatively with 
the BBC (instead of quantitatively for greater audience share). 
By the time of the 1977 Annan Report, ITN News was widely considered 
to have the edge over BBC News. Annan’s chief legacy, the better known 
Channel 4 model, built on these initiatives by employing a combination of 
cross-subsidy revenue provision from the Channel 3 companies with, again, 
the outsourcing of news provision. From this developed the highly regarded 
Channel 4 News. 
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United Kingdom deregulation towards a ‘light touch’ regime in the wake 
of satellite and later digital terrestrial multi-channelling during the last 20 
years was slower and more complex than the earlier US developments. The 
‘technologies of freedom’ position was certainly advocated by Rupert Murdoch 
and others. The title and content of Murdoch’s landmark 1989 MacTaggart 
Lecture, for example, ‘Freedom in Broadcasting’ echoed Pool very strongly 
(Murdoch, 1989; Keane,  2005). However, unlike the US, this neoliberal dis-
course faced a much more entrenched public service ethos across the whole 
regulatory system, not just the BBC.
At the level of content regulation, multi-channelling meant a shift to 
an increasing reliance on complaints procedures as the prospect of content 
monitoring by a regulator became impractical. Overall, Channel 4 is perhaps 
the best bellwether of these developments. It was permitted to head ‘down-
market’ in its general programming, which had originally been avant-garde 
and multicultural: Channel 4 instead became the UK home of Big Brother 
and similar ‘reality’ and ‘lifestyle’ programming. However, the structural 
and content regulation of its news were largely preserved. Channel 4 News, 
accordingly, has held its reputation, including a reputation for investigative 
journalism, even if its ‘seriousness’ seems at odds with much of Channel 4’s 
other programming.  
Interregnum: From broadcasting to press regulatory practices 
One of the key themes emerging in the wake of the Leveson Inquiry is the 
contrast between the success of UK broadcasting regulation and the series 
of failures in press regulation in Britain, despite three Royal Commissions 
into the Press and a Privacy Committee since 1949. The accusation of fail-
ure may have been a controversial point at one time but is currently almost 
universally accepted by participants in the Leveson Inquiry, not only because 
of the hacking scandal but because of the continued failure to establish self-
regulatory procedures that ensured trust. James Curran’s considerable body 
of work is perhaps the most consistent means of tracking this issue in the UK, 
both for its historical depth (Curran & Seaton, 2010) and for his prescient 
recognition of the appropriateness of the comparison between UK broadcast-
ing and press regulation (Curran 1995). It is from his work that I borrow the 
term ‘First Amendment fundamentalism’.
The US case in broadcasting (de)regulation demonstrates the unintended 
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consequences of a curious alliance between technological determinism and 
neoliberal deregulatory logics, underwritten by ‘first amendment fundamen-
talism’. It also provides an important indication that what might first appear 
to be regulation that restricts journalistic freedom can also be regulation to 
protect journalism from fundamentalist political speech and so enhance the 
deliberative qualities of a public sphere. 
In many ways these differing legacies set the scene for today’s differing 
lines of demarcation of professional—or, in populist language, ‘elite’— 
journalism from other modes. In the UK the line runs between broadcast 
journalism and the quality newspapers, on the one hand, and redtop tabloids 
on the other. In the US, that line runs through broadcast journalism itself as 
well as through  newspapers. Murdoch’s television interests in each country 
to some extent mark that differing point of demarcation: Sky (UK) practices 
a form of quality emulation of  the BBC resembling ITN’s while Fox News 
(US) does the opposite.  
However, even this does not quite capture the distinction at stake here. 
The risk in framing the issue as the previous paragraph did is that it conflates 
professionalism and traditional forms of high/low cultural distinctions estab-
lished within the UK tradition (as does my use of ‘pseudo-journalism’ above). 
If we instead were to map the demarcation from the opposite pole we 
could speak instead of how fundamentalist and partisan political discourses 
are managed in each regulatory regime. In the US’s free speech tradition such 
discourses flourished more readily without prior constraint or professional 
mediation, even under the Fairness Doctrine. The UK’s anti-editorialisation 
principle in broadcasting regulation displaced these practices into print journal-
ism. Hence the important hybridity of much ‘professional tabloid’ news— that 
it is constituted by a struggle between such populist discourses and journalistic 
ethical conventions such as multiple sourcing, verification and the separation 
of fact from opinion. 
Of course, all the above assumes what Chalaby (1996) has christened the 
‘Anglo-American invention’ of objective journalism. As Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) have elaborated, in many European journalistic traditions partisanship 
has been the norm, albeit now generally yielding to the Anglo-American model. 
Crucially then, the crisis of the press council model of self-regulation has 
provoked an opportunity for policymakers to seriously develop a radically 
different framework from Pool’s for thinking about the relationship between 
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digital convergence and regulation. There can no longer be an inevitable 
assumption that the digital future will be regulation-free and entirely ‘market 
driven’. The harbinger of this challenge was most likely the successful move 
into online content provision by public service broadcasters. This development 
was the target of James Murdoch’s 2009 MacTaggart Lecture which somewhat 
hubristically drew on Darwin rather than Pool to rearticulate the determinist 
dimensions of the challenged neoliberal deregulatory vision. Its title was ‘The 
Absence of Trust’ (Murdoch, 2009). The titular trust refers here not to trust in 
journalism or publishers but a populist directive to ‘trust the people’s will’ —as 
evidenced by market preferences—and so remove all need for ‘paternalist’ 
regulation (Jones, 2011; but cf Hitchens, 2006, for more detail). 
Australia: No worries?
What of Australia’s regulatory legacy in this context? It was conventional in 
the broadcast era for domestic assessments to regard Australia’s ‘dual sys-
tem’ as ‘the best of both worlds’ in its combination of an ABC with a regu-
lated commercial system. As I have argued elsewhere, this view is fallacious, 
primarily because Australia deployed neither the British innovations in com-
mercial broadcast regulation nor a US-style Fairness Doctrine (Jones, 2001; 
but cf Hitchens, 2006, for more detail). The track record of under-regulation 
of broadcast journalism and political speech is remarkably similar to that for 
press regulation. The linkage may well be ownership concentration, notably 
the comparatively unusual permission granted to newspaper proprietors to 
take up licences at the foundation of television broadcasting. 
Hoffmann-Riems’ 1996 comparative assessment of the normative deficit 
in Australian commercial broadcast regulation—specifically here of con-
tent—stands today still: 
Above all, Australian broadcasting law did not stipulate that commercial 
broadcasters ensure substantive plurality or balanced consideration of 
all relevant interests. …The bonds between broadcasting regulation 
and the functioning of a democratic society have thus far not been 
made the subject of any special normative provisions under Australian 
broadcasting law. One also finds no specific precautions against the risk 
of one-sided influence— a thoroughly remarkable situation in view of 
the degree of media concentration. (Hoffmann-Riems, 1996, p. 246)
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So it seems likely Australian practice partly informed James Murdoch’s 
Darwinian neoliberal populist utopia (Jones 2011). The recurrent crises of 
ethical legitimacy in commercial television current affairs journalism and 
talk(back) radio—the spaces of pseudo-journalism—are the most indicative 
fruits of this under-regulation. They inspired the content regulation recom-
mendations for fairness and accuracy standards—as opposed to self-regulatory 
codes—by the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Broadcasting (2000). 
That report also recommended a clause on freedom of expression in the major 
regulatory legislation. 
Thus, despite its incomplete borrowings from the US and UK, the Austral-
ian system has been anything but a perfect embodiment of Hallin and Mancini’s 
Anglo-American Liberal model (Jones & Pusey, 2010). 
Australia enjoys neither of the key regulatory foundations to which poli-
cymakers in the US and UK would currently turn in reimagining the role, if 
any, of press regulation. In the continuing absence of a constitutional protec-
tion of freedom of speech or press, Australian policymakers cannot turn to 
a constitutional rationale for our under-regulation, the implied freedom of 
political communication notwithstanding (Jones, 2003). Nor can they turn 
to a successful tradition of sophisticated commercial broadcasting regulation 
like the UK’s. 
Three inquiries
This is the appropriate comparative context in which to place the two re-
cently completed inquiries that form the basis of current policy reviews in 
Australia: The Convergence Review chaired by Glen Boreham (Boreham, 
2011; 2012) and the Independent Media Inquiry into the Media and Media 
Regulation chaired by Justice Finkelstein (Finkelstein, 2012). The former 
was conducted over 12 months from March 2011 and the latter was initiated 
more quickly following much political debate. Finkelstein was appointed on 
14 September 2011 and required to submit his report by 28 February 2012. 
This means that The Convergence Review already had six months’ momen-
tum and a later submission date than Finkelstein’s. Moreover, Finkelstein’s 
Report needed to be referred to the Convergence Review. Accordingly the 
Final Report of the Convergence Review includes a commentary on key rec-
ommendations of the Finkelstein Review and even a comparison of their 
differing recommendations for a cross-platform news regulator. 
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Both reports address the issue of freedom of speech and communication 
in their respective approaches to (de)regulation.
The Boreham Inquiry, it must be said, sits in a long tradition of Austral-
ian inquiries informed by technologically determinist Poolian deregulatory 
rhetoric. Accordingly, it moves from the same premises as Pool’s regarding 
what is now called a rapidly changing ‘media landscape’—i.e. digital con-
vergence—for which the broadcast era licensing model is deemed no longer 
valid.  Thus the outright abolition of licences is proposed in the Convergence 
Report. However, as noted above, a Poolian constitutional default position is 
not available in Australia.  So a remarkably amorphous conception of freedom 
of communication is invoked with no constitutional or legal basis provided 
(2012, p. 25). Despite Hitchens’ warnings in one of her submissions (2011), 
the report tends to practice the Poolian neoliberal conflation of public-citizen-
consumer.
The closest the Final Convergence Review Report comes to an elabora-
tion of its position on freedom of communication is in its discussion of the 
Finkelstein Report (2012, p. 69), to which it simply defers. It arises directly 
from the thorny question of how to maintain news standards in the deregulated 
scenario envisaged by the report (as even self/co-regulatory codes of practice 
are currently tied to licensing). It also acknowledges Hitchens’ warning (2011) 
that its earlier position that ‘community standards’ were a sufficient basis for 
content regulation was flawed, and that ethical standards are a quite discrete 
matter. Reliance on ‘community standards’ alone would have been remarkably 
close to James Murdoch’s populist notion of ‘trust’.
The Finkestein Inquiry gave great prominence to freedom of speech and 
the press in its Issues Paper (pp. 345-347) and its report’s second chapter on 
‘The Democratic Indispensibility of  a Free Press’ (2012, pp. 23-54). 
However, the trajectory of its discussion is quite unusual, which can only 
be assumed to be a product of the unreasonable haste with which the report 
needed to be prepared. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press tend to 
be conflated. Such conflation is a recognised problem in much of the media 
regulatory literature as the role of journalists, editors and publishers—and, of 
course, speakers outside journalism—are likewise conflated as a result: That 
is, the very different roles and power relations of each of these claimants to the 
freedom are thus obscured, most obviously the power of proprietors and editors 
over jobbing journalists (Barendt, 1991). This conflation may partly explain 
 62  PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 18 (2) 2012
REBUILDING PUBLIC TRUST
why the fourth estate metaphor is presented together with the philosophical 
rationales for freedom of speech. Fourth estate is, rather, a quite distinct and 
far more pragmatically compromised notion that has been long criticised 
for its legitimation of publisher property rights and market advantage dating 
from the dissolution of the 19th century British radical presses (Curran, 1979; 
Boyce 1978; Jones, 2000). 
Finkelstein’s report also lacks a central discussion of the constitutional 
place of freedom of speech/press in Australia. Instead it tends to be assumed 
that freedom of the speech/press should be central to these discussions for 
Australian policymaking as Australia is a Western liberal democracy (e.g. 
Finkelstein, 2012,  p.36). So the absence of a federal bill or charter of rights 
and the discovery of an implied freedom by the High Court in the 1990s are 
likewise marginalised (Finkelstein, 2012 p. 32). 
Perhaps predictably then, US literature features prominently, notably 
that on the Social Responsibility tradition in discussions of US journalism. 
The chapter’s final synthesis is heavily dependent on the work of Michael 
Schudson which, while usually valuable, is also usually blind  to the regula-
tion of broadcast journalism. Indeed the relation between broadcast content 
regulation and freedom of speech is only discussed in a completely discrete 
section on the Fairness Doctrine that primarily concerns fears of a ‘chilling 
effect’ by any statutory regulation. The impression is left that such content 
regulation of broadcast journalism was an historical oddity. There is no funda-
mental consideration of  the positive free speech rationales for media regula-
tion usually presented in comparative media law monographs as a European 
counter-tradition (to the US negative freedom tradition) (eg. Barendt 1993). 
Somehow Pool’s ‘anomaly’ has crept into this report too.  
Somewhat ironically then, the dominant ‘logic’ of the Finkelstein Report 
tends to operate within the terms of the very binary that has haunted it since 
its publication—statutory regulation vs freedom of speech. It does, of course, 
recommend the former but provides no discussion of the major—and still ac-
tive—precedent for statutory regulation relating to journalism compatible with 
freedom of speech: the UK’s experience in regulation of broadcast journalism.
Perhaps it is unsurprising then that the same binary is used by the Final 
Convergence Report to cast the Finkelstein recommendations as the alterna-
tive to its own self-regulatory preference. 
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Given that there is no longer any rationale to treat print and broadcast 
media differently, the Convergence Review believes there should be 
a single cross-platform body responsible for news and commentary 
standards. There are two options. One option is to move print and online 
media into statutory regulation consistent with the recommendations of 
the Independent Media Inquiry. The other option is to move broadcast 
news and commentary into a self-regulatory structure together with 
print and online media. 
The Convergence Review has adopted a deregulatory approach and 
therefore proposes the self-regulatory structure for all news and com-
mentary in the first instance. This will allow the industry to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of platform-neutral, self-regulatory arrangements. 
Once this scheme has operated for a period of time, the government 
can determine whether self-regulation is working or whether further 
measures should be considered. (Boreham,  2012, p. 50)
So here we have the Poolian neoliberal vision hard up against its undesirable 
Other. To be fair, both reports are more nuanced than this in their scenarios 
for establishing their cross-platform regulators with even the Convergence 
Review envisaging the use of legal privilege to induce publisher participa-
tion in its self-regulatory entity. 
Yet by failing to provide any account of the firm linkage between free 
speech principles and successful models of statutory regulation of broadcast 
journalism, the two reports have left the door wide open for the attacks they 
have suffered—and to a likely High Court challenge, based in the implied 
freedom of political communication, to any enabling legislation. 
Luckily there is Leveson, still proceeding as this article was drafted. 
Its less publicised Module 4 explored regulatory options for the future. The 
newspaper publishers followed Leveson’s earlier advice and returned to 
the inquiry with a revised self-regulatory model (Press Standards Board of 
Finance Ltd, 2012). It is based in a complex contractual system of publisher 
participation designed to address the previous failure of press councils to 
ensure universal publisher participation. It was found under examination to 
be unable to guarantee publisher participation, and its complaints handling 
process was found to be heavily weighted towards representation by current 
editors of newspapers. Again and again Counsel Jay put to Lord Black the 
proposition that a statutory system was more likely to deliver both universal 
participation and visibly impartial complaints handling. Again and again the 
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reply came—‘freedom of the press’…(Leveson, 2012a). This is precisely what 
Curran called in his briefing to the inquiry ‘first amendment fundamentalism’ 
(Curran, 2011). 
Perhaps the watershed moment came on July 12 when the head of OFCOM, 
the UK broadcast regulator, declared the latest newspaper industry proposals 
for press council reform unworkable and lacking in transparency compared 
to equivalent broadcast regulatory procedures (Leveson Inquiry, 2012c). 
One of the most impressive submissions so far has been that from the 
Media Standards Trust (2012). It is crafted as an historical critique of previous 
UK press inquiries and their consequences. Its key point is that the kind of 
panglossian self-regulatory scenario painted in the Convergence Report cita-
tion above has been tried and failed many times. The window of opportunity 
for real effect by any such inquiry is small. Thus any recommendations need 
to be immediately operational and not dependent on publishers’ consciences 
or their performances of goodwill—or mea culpas—before inquiries. Its key 
innovation is to maintain industry-based self-regulation but to oversee that 
with a ‘backstop independent auditor’ (BIA).  Here statutory legislation would 
play its role, as the trust’s director explained to Leveson:  
... the statute really performs three functions. The first is to oblige large 
news organisations to have basic internal complaints and compliance 
mechanisms. The second is to oblige those same large publishing 
organisations to participate in a self-regulatory organisation—and we 
anticipate that actually there will probably be one to begin with. ….
The third is to set up a BIA and to …nominate its principles under which 
it is set up and nominate and restrain its powers. (Leveson Inquiry, 
2012b, pp. 53-54) 
This is only one of several models in play but the fundamental point is cru-
cial—that ‘buffers’ are possible which ensure the freedom is preserved while 
ethical standards are transparently regulated. There is a clear continuity, if 
not causality, here from the UK’s innovative broadcast regulatory practices 
in providing for similar buffers between licence-holders, news providers and 
regulatory agencies, not to mention ‘market forces’. 
In short, my brief comparative account has sought to demonstrate that 
regulatory innovation can enhance freedom of content but recent Australian 
inquiries have sadly overlooked this fact. Likewise ‘first amendment funda-
mentalism’ is perhaps best redefined in the moment of Leveson as a dogmatic 
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adherence to the neoliberal argument— a la Pool—that digitisation is inher-
ently deregulatory and so necessarily enhances freedoms of speech and press. 
No regulatory sophistication is thought to be needed. All forms of statutory 
regulation are thus insisted to be anomalously incompatible with the freedoms 
in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. 
In the absence of either a constitutional freedom or an innovative legacy 
in regulatory sophistication in Australia, the Australian Parliament would do 
well to await the Leveson Report and the possibility that its recommendations 
will generate a practicable model for news regulation worthy of consideration, 
if not emulation. 
Note
1. ‘Pseudo-journalism’ may seem overly polemical but I am here attempting to 
capture the scale of subordination of journalistic norms to commercial or other 
imperatives. 
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